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H is further adjudged that all acts taken in such action
the Houorable John A. J:Iewicker subsequent to Friday,
16, I 9i58, are declared null, void and of no effect.

Gibson, C.•T., Carter, J
concurred.

I<'. Xo. 19978.
JA~H<}S

Traynor, ,T., and Sehaucr, ,J.,

In Bank.

)Jov. 21, 1958.]

W. 'l'TTPPBH, Petitioner, v. SUPBlUOR COUR'l'
OP MARIN COrN'rY, Respondent.

[1] Prohiilitlon-Employment in Criminal Proceedings-Preliminary Hearing.-Prohibition does not lie to review rulings of the
oll admi~:sibility of evidence at a prdiminary heariug- unless the cmmnitmeut is based entirely on incompetent
eYidence.
[2a, 2b] Id.-Pi'Gsnmptions.-In a proeeeding in prohibition to restrain the ~uperior court from proeeediug to trial on an information charging petitioner with being an acceo8ory to a felony
(Pen. Code, § 32), n[tcr the committing mngistrate refused,
at the pn•limiuary pxamination, to allow dPfcndant to see
written statemm1t,; of two ;juvetlile witnesses eoucerning their
respedin~ role~ in t!tP theft ol' hub Ntps from a parked car
und in uhtaining- from deft>ndaut, a elm·k in :m automobile
supply ;;ton•. a n•<·cipt indicating that one of the boys had
purchased the 1JUb caps Jrom the ~ton•, it will he presumed
that the snpcrio;· court \Yill not erroneouc:ly deny defendant
opportunity to see the statemcnb at the time of trial and that
the.v will tlH•re !'oro he avnilable to him for impettchment purposes at that time.
[3] !d.-Employment in C!imimJ Proceedings-Preliminary Hearing.-\Vhc>re the committing magi~trate had jurisdiction ovee
both the erime nnd the JWr~on of defendant and there was
sub;tantial evidenec to support the magistrate's finding that
tlwre wns prohahle euuso to belien• dPfendnnt guilty of the
oiiense with \':hieh he 1vns dwr:;ed, prohibition does not lie to
review the
of the mngisirate on a procedural matter,
the •·mumilliiCllt not being based entirely on incompetent
evid('Jl('P.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Prohibition, 8 GG; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 22.
MGK. Dig. Reference3: [ l, 3 J Prohihition, ~ 4~); [2] Prohibition,
§58.

to

witnesses revealed
sheriff written statements eonroles in the theft and in obtaining
defendant
another incontributing
§702).
set aside the
was denied.
is court's determination
not basr:d
on
ibition lie to review the niling
npon the admission or exclusion

of the
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that the superior court will
defendant the opportunity to see the witnessPs statements at the time of trial (llhtchell v. Superior
) , or on proper motion before trial
48 Cal.2d 704, 707 709 [312 P.2d
).

[3]

the
rules to the facts in the present
case, it is evident that the committing magistrate had jurisdiction over both the crime and the person of defendant. It is
likewise apparent that there was substantial evidence to
support the committing magistrate's finding that there was
cause to believe defendant was guilty of the offense
·with which he was chargPd. Therefore, under rule 1, supra,
since the commitment was not based entirely on incompetent
the writ of prohibition does not lie to review the
ruling of the magistrate on a procedural matter.
[2b] The value to defendant of seeing the statements made
by the witnesses is that to do so might enable him to impeach
their testimony at the trial. However, under rule 2, supra, it
will be presumed that the superior court will not erroneously
deny defendant the opportunity to see the statements at the
time of trial and that they will therefore be available to him
for impeachment purposes at that time. Consequently, defendant has failed to show any reason for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition.
The alternative writ is discharged, and the peremptory writ
is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTEH, J., Concurring aud Dissenting.-I agree with the
majority that petitiouer 's commitment is not based on incompetent cvidcuec and under the rule announced in Rogers
Court, 46 Cal.2d 3, 7 [2Dl P.2d 929], prohibition
is not an available remedy. (Sec Mitchell v. Superior Court,
50 Cal.2d 827, 829 [ 330 P.2d 48 J.) However, I cannot
assent to the implitatiou contaiued in the majority opinion
that petitioner is not now entitled to auy relief. An examination of the uncontroverted facts convinces me that petitioner
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is immediately entitled to the production of tllc written statements of the two witnesses now in the hands of publie officials.
Sueh relief may be granted by treating the present application
as a petition for writ of mandate.
Although petitioner has asked only for prohibition to stay
further proceedings, where the facts developed upon a hearing
show that petitioner ic; entitled to some other relief, but nndee
a different form of writ, this court has authority to grant any
appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings.
(Board of 'Trustees v. State Bd. of Equalizahon, 1 Cal.2cl
784, 787 [37 P.2d 84, 96 A.L.H. 775]; Caminctti v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal.2d 838, 848 [108 P.2d 911]; Yerdier v. Superior
Court, 88 Cal.App.2d 527, 531 [199 P.2d 325] ; Simmons v.
Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 133 [214 P.2d 844, 19
A.L.R.2d 288] .) This authority clearly extends to issuing
mandamus where warranted. (Powell v. S1tperior Cond, 48
Cal.2d 704, 708 [312 P.2d 698] .)
A writ of mandate will issue where it is shown that the
court has violated a clear and present beneficial right of the
petitioner. (May v. Board of Directors, 34 Cal.2d 125, 138
[208 P.2d 661]; Williams v. Stockton, 195 CaL 743 [235 P.
986] ; McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.2d
386, 394 [159 P.2d 944] ; Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d
559, 561 [212 P.2d 878].) The existence of another equally
adequate legal remedy docs not require us to dismiss the
present proceedings. 'Where, as here, the District Court of
Appeal has issued alternative writs, determined the matter
on the merits and granted a peremptory writ of prohibition,
the principle of economy, both as to time and expense, justi ..
fics our accepting the District Court's decision that there was
no other adequate remedy at law. (See Bmclrg v. Superior
Court, 44 Ca1.2d 574, 582 [283 P.2d 704]; Atkinson v. Supe ..
rior Cmtrt, 49 Cal.2d 338, 342 [316 P.2d 960] .) ]1-,or this
reason it is unnecessary to consider the effect of petitioner's
failure to apply for relief in the superior court.
At the trial stage in a criminal prosecution a defendant
has a right to compel the production of documents in the
p!'Oseeutor 's possession. (People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 587
[:\05 P.2d 1].J 'l'o establish this right there must be a request
for specific documents, it must be shown that the demand is
not for the purpose of a ''fishing expedition'' on the chance
something impeaching might turn up, anc1 there must be good
reason to believe that the document when produced ·would be
admissible in evidence for some purpose. (People v. Riser,
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supra, 47 Cal.2d at 587.) However, it is not a prerequisite
to establishing this right to show a conflict between the witnesses to be impeached and the written statements, because
it would be impossible to determine whether there was good
reason to believe the document was admissible without having
seen it. The chance that it might eventually turn out to be
inadmissible should not block production at the threshold.
(Peoplf v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 587.) In other words
defendant's right to compel production of the document cannot he defeated by arguing that it would be inadmisBible, since
the question of admissibility is reserved until the document
is inspected.
J'ustifieat iou for affording defendant sueh a right is explained by the true purpose of a eriminal trial, the ascertainment of faet,;. The state':;; interest and goal in criminal
prosecutions is not to secure a eonviction in every ease by any
expedient means however odious, but rather only through
establishing the truth upon a public trial fair to defendant
and state alike. (People v. R1:ser, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 585;
Powell v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.2d at 707; see J enck.s
v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667-668 [77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.
2d 1103).)
\Vhere, however, pretrial produetion of documents is sought,
the ea:;;es hold, although it is not entirely dear, that pretrial
inspection and produetion is a question addressed to the
sound disr:retion of the trial eourt. (Prnu;/1 v. Superior Court,
supra, 48 Ca1.2d 704; see Walker v. Su.periur Court. 155 Cal.
App.2(! ]:3-J- j>l17 P.2t1 1:30]; Cordry v. Superior Court. lGl
Cal.App.2d 267 [326 P.2d 222]; Castiel v. Superior Cmt1·t
162 Cal.App.2d 710, 711 j:128 P.2d 476j. This din'rsity of
treatment in compelling the production of documents between
the trial and pretrial stages is erroneous. An examination of
the reasons for treating a request for documents at the trial
stage as a right and the samr requrst at the pretrial stage
as a matter of discretion, reveals that the problem in each
instanee is identical as is the rationale. Since there appears
to be 110 reason for this difference, we may conclude that a
defendant is entitled as a matter of right to compel the
production of doeuments at the pretrial stages. To establish
this right the defendant will be governed by the same principles as at the trial stages.
A reYiew of the cases ordering pt·t>trial llistlosurc substantiates this conclusion.
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In Powell v. Superior
sttpra, this court stated that
a motion for pretrial
of certain written statements
made by the petitioner was addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. In concluding there was an abuse of discretion
the court reasoned that to
the aeeused
of his
where he has
\Yhat he
with
that the statements may be
to refresh
his recollection would be to Jose
of
ascertainment of the facts
a
trial fair to defendant and state alike.
'fhe District Court of Appeal in W olker v.
supra, issued a writ of mandate to
of a state crime laboratory report concerning the aecused 's
shoes. It was conceded that the report itself was not evidence,
but where petitioner alleged that the prosecution will contend the deceased's death resulted from
kicked
petitioner and that the only source of information from which the
defense could discover what evidence the shoes provided is the
report, the trial court, in the interest of
should order
that a copy be provided for the accused.
On facts similar to the Powell case, mandamus was issued in
Cordry v. Superior Court, supra, where defendant alleged
that he could not recollect the content of his statements. In
Costiel v. Superior Court, stlpro, mandamus was issued to
vindicate petitioner's previously established judicial right
to the name of the informer, which was information essential
to the preparation of an adequate defense.
In every case in which pretrial production was
the
request was made in order to better prepare a defense. This
is the reason for the request at the trial level. \\There the
pretrial request is granted, it is on the theory that the purpose
of a criminal prosecution is the ascertainment of the facts
in the process of conducting an equally fair trial. As has
already been noted this is the same rationale for compelling
production at the trial stage. \\There the same relief is
sought for the same reasons there is no reason for diverse
treatment.
It has sometimes been hinted that the pretrial production
of written statements should be in the discretion of the trial
court because it might hamper law enforeement
v.
Superior Conrt, supra, 48 Cal.2d at 708) and it wonid create
an imbalanee between the
of
and
defense as well as enable the defendant to secure perjured

and fabricated evidence to meet the state's case
v. Riser·, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 585).
that law enforcement might be hampered has
no
here since i here is no claim that such would be
the 0ffeet. Moreove1·, no daim is made that these statements
eonlldentia1 or
California and federal cases
the
that
disclosure ·would create an hnbalanee
the defense with too great an advantage. This is
that the state's interest and goal in criminal prosecutions is not eonvictions but the establishment of truth in a
trial fair to defendant and state alike. (Powell v. Superior
supra, 4.8 Ca1.2d at 707; .Jencks v. United States,
supra, c\5~~ U.S. at 6G7-668; see
v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal.
2d at 585.)
The concern
about possible fabrication of evidence
and
testimony if pretrial production is permitted is
unnecessary and unwarranted. If a defendant is indicted, he
must be provided with a transcript of the evidence taken by
the grand jury.
Code, § 925.) If he is charged by
information, he has a pre1iminary hearing at which prosecution witnesses testify. In either circumstance the accused has
at his disposal suffic,ient information from which he can predicate an informed guess as to the prosecution's theory of guilt.
If sueh comprehensive information is available to an accused
prior to trial he has all he needs on which to base fabricated
evidence or
testimony if he desires. To compel
disclosure of other information, which would be admissible,
can scarcely be said to constitute any appreciable increase in
this danger.
Petitioner herein was denied pretrial production of the
written statements of two key prosecution witnesses. He
has established his right to compel produetion by requesting
specific statements, by showing he was not intent on a "fishing
expedition" and by alleging with particularity that the statements are for impeachment purposes and hence production is
necessary to determine admissibility.
'l'he need for the written statements to insure the ascertainment o!' the facts in a trial fair to defendant and state alike
is obvious. In preparing any defense considerable attention
is given to cross-rxamination. Since cross-examination has
been described as the foremost leg·al engine ever invented for
discovering the truth (5 "Wigmore, Evidence, § 1367), the
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time eonsumed t lH'rehy i:,; well spent and the :,;tate's interest
in ascertaining truth is also vindieated. Chw aspeet of crossexamination is to produee or extraet faets whieh diminish the
personal trustworthiness of the ·witness. ( 5 \Vigmore, Bvidenee, § 1368.) Included as a method of diminishing trustworthiness is impeaehment, and therefore, it too is a necessary
part of preparing a defensl'. Thus, as a matter pertaining
to the defense, petitioner is entitled to compel production of
the documents for his use in cross-examining the witnesses on
the substanee of their previous statements.
For the foregoing reasons this court should issue a writ of
mandate ordering the produetion of the written statements for
defendant's inspection.

[L. A. Xo. 25138.

In Bank.

.i\ov. 25, 1958.]

JAMES IRIAR'l', Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHWEST
FEH'l'ILIZEH A:t\D CHRMICAL COMPANY (a Partnership) et al., Defendants and Appellants; B. F.
KNAPP et al., Interveners and Appellants.
[1] Chattel Mortgages- Extinguishment of Lien- Removal of
Crop.-Creditors of a grower-lessee holding a mortgage on a
cotton crop lost the security of their crop mortgage when they
eonsente,} to the harvesting, removal and sale of the crop by
the mortgagor. ( Civ. Code, § 2972.)
[2] Assignments-Equitable Assignments.-Evidencc of an equitable assignment must be elcar and specific; the assignor must
not rdain any control over the fund or any authority to collect.
[3] !d.-Equitable Assigmneuts.-In an action to determine priority in the proe<,eds of a cotton crop sold by a gin company,
in which plaintiff claimed title as lessor to a designated percentage of the crop as rent and defendants claimed title as
attaching creditors of the grower-lessee, and in which the
holders of a crop mortgage lien intervened claiming priority,
the evidence would not support a finding of an equitable assignment of the proceeds to the holders of the mortgage lien
or that such proceeds were held in trust for them by the gin
company and as such were not subject to attachment, where
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Chattel Mortgages, § 72.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 3; Am.Jur., Assignments, § 3.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Chattel Mortgag·cs, § 66; [2, 3] Assignments, § 27; [ 4, 5] Crops, § 15.

